By Edwin Cooney
Dated Friday, August 10th 2007
THE PRESENT, Tuesday, August 7th, 2007. As everyone knew it would, when it finally happened it only took an instant. The scoreboard clock read 8:51 p.m. Pacific Time as Washington National’s left-hander Mike Bacsik fired a fastball toward the inside corner of home plate at China Basin’s AT&T Park in San Francisco, California.
In less than three tenths of a second from the time the ball left Bacsik’s hand, Barry Bonds studied the rotation of the baseball hurdling toward the protective armature on his right elbow — and decided to swing at the ninety plus mile per hour pitch.
That decision made, Bonds had to hurl the head of his thirty-three ounce maple bat at the incoming pitch at just the right height and at the exact angle essential for solid contact by a round bat against a round ball.
If Mr. Bonds was right, the ball would change direction ever so slightly away from Barry’s right elbow and cross the plate in front of him where he judged it was going to be. If Bonds was wrong, the ball would either dip sufficiently below and inside of the range of Barry’s bat head or outside and out of the range of Bond’s bat, causing the determined slugger to hit the ball at a bad angle or to miss the pitch entirely.
Because forty-three year old Barry Lamar Bonds judged correctly, there was a sharp crack as maple met cowhide. The nine inch, five-and-a-half ounce baseball was on its four-hundred and thirty-five foot trajectory to Section 144 just to the left field side of the four-hundred and twenty-one foot sign in the right center field bleachers. Reaching its destination, the well-hit baseball became the seven-hundred and fifty-sixth home run of Barry Bonds’ major league career. Finally, at long last, Bonds had passed Hank Aaron’s record of seven-hundred and fifty-five major league career home runs.
Once in the bleachers, the baseball would be the object of much pushing, shoving, poking, diving and falling by desperate and ill-mannered fans. Finally, the ball would be pounced upon by twenty-two-year-old Matt Murphy of Queens, New York—-a New York Mets fan.
As fate would have it, Murphy was on his way to Australia with a friend (whom I’m told wore a Yankees shirt) and just happened to have come to AT&T Park during his San Francisco layover. Matt Murphy just happened to have purchased a ticket for the game about an hour before game time. His reward, after a short and somewhat bloody tussle, was the yet to be valued (but nevertheless priceless) “Bonds’ ball”.
As the crowd cheered, Giants’ officials gathered for a special ceremony. Directing everyone’s attention to the scoreboard video screen in centerfield, Barry, his family, Willie Mays (Barry’s godfather) and everyone else saw the image of Henry Louis Aaron (the just-deposed home run king) congratulating Barry Bonds in a short but very dignified and tasteful statement.
Asserting that home run hitting required skill, longevity and determination, Aaron, now seventy-three, declared:
“…I move over now and offer my best wishes to Barry and his family on this historical achievement. My hope today,” concluded Aaron, “as it was on that April evening in 1974 [referring to his seven-hundred and fifteenth home run which broke Babe Ruth’s seven-hundred and fourteen home run career record], is that the accomplishment of this record will inspire others to chase their own dreams.”
Next came the newly crowned home run king himself. Thanking the fans of San Francisco, his team mates, the visiting Washington Nationals (for their understanding of the need for the ceremony), his godfather Willie Mays, his mother, his wife and children, Barry Bonds concluded with an especially emotional tribute.
Pointing to the sky as he had right after crossing home plate and hugging his bat boy son Nikolai, Barry thanked his late father Bobby Lee Bonds who had taught him everything he knew about baseball. The tears and cheers that followed sent a message to the skeptical world outside of San Francisco that, whatever the outside world thought or felt, Barry Bonds was both a hero and home run king in San Francisco. Long live the king! So powerful was that message that it obscured, in the awareness of most, the fact that the night would end with a loss of the game by the San Francisco Giants to the Washington Nationals by a score of 8 to 6.
THE PAST. One-hundred and thirty-one years have passed since the modern game of baseball was born. It has become America’s “National Pastime”. More than any other sport, baseball relies on tradition as a major part of its appeal.
In watching what took place the other night at San Francisco’s AT&T Park, tradition was very evident. Not only was the new home run king, the son of Bobby Lee Bonds, a fourteen year and eight team Major League veteran, but Michael Joseph Bacsik, the son of Michael James Bacsik, was a five year and two team Major League veteran as well.
In fact, daddy Mike Bacsik had pitched to Hank Aaron on August 23rd of 1976 after Aaron had hit what would be his last career home run, number seven fifty-five. Thus, Mike, Sr. and young Mike both pitched to men who had the same number of career home runs. Had Mike Sr. given up a home run to Hank Aaron, father and son would have both given up career number seven fifty-six to the two men. Bacsik Sr, a right-hander, was pitching for the Texas Rangers in 1976 while Hank Aaron was playing out his final baseball season with the American League’s Milwaukee Brewers. Even that was baseball tradition as the Atlanta Braves, Hank’s team when he broke Babe Ruth’s record in 1974, had once been the Milwaukee Braves. Hank had helped bring a world championship to Milwaukee when his Braves beat the Yankees in the 1957 World Series. By the time Mike Bacsik, Sr. pitched to “Hammerin’ Henry”, there were no home runs left in Aaron’s powerful wrists and potent bat. Aaron did get a single off the senior Bacsik, but that was it. No one could know on that August Monday in 1976 that another tradition had been born—but that’s baseball.
Born to Bobby Lee and Patricia Bonds on July 24th, 1964, Barry Bonds was the son of a baseball star. He became the godson of a baseball “super star”. (It also should be noted here that through his mother Patricia Bonds he is a cousin of still another baseball superstar, Reggie Martinez Jackson.) Barry was four years old when the San Francisco Giants brought his powerful and speedy dad to the majors to play alongside of Willie Mays.
Unlike Willie Mays, Bobby Bonds’ gifts of both power and speed (primarily because they weren’t as persistent or long lasting) were not rewarded with team loyalty. After the 1974 season, Bobby Bonds was traded from the Giants to the Yankees. While that was worthy of a star, playing at Yankee Stadium made pressure-packed demands on the senior Bonds. What exactly happened to Bobby Bonds while he was a member of the Yankees, I’ve never learned. However, it must have been significant, because although Bobby Bonds hit 32 home runs for the Yankees, he was traded off to the California Angels after only one year in New York. Even more, during the six years remaining of his career—1977 through 1981—Bobby Bonds would play with six more teams.
The demands and the unfairness of a professional baseball experience obviously made a lasting impression on young Barry. Signed by the Pittsburgh Pirates in 1985, Barry was in the majors by 1986. It was in 1990 that he came into his own, batting .301, hitting thirty-two home runs, stealing fifty-two bases and winning the first of his seven National League MVP awards.
Following his 1992 MVP season with Pittsburgh, Barry Bonds signed with the San Francisco Giants. His father had also signed, that spring, a Giants’ contract as their first base coach. Barry had come home, but his presence cost the Giants $43,000,000 through 1998. It can’t be denied that Barry earned every penny! However, with all of his considerable achievements, there was a downside to Barry Bonds.
Bonds was often moody with teammates, the press and even with the fans. It wasn’t until the 1998 season that there was a discernable change in Barry Bonds.
That year, Mark McGwire, a man whom it is said Bonds considered an inferior player, captured nationwide headlines by hitting seventy home runs for the St. Louis Cardinals. It has also been asserted by some that McGwire’s burst of power wasn’t so much a matter of ability as it was the result of taking growth hormone steroids. So, many people believed that Bonds decided that if McGwire could do it and get away with it, why shouldn’t he? Thus, history began to be made.
Beginning in 1999, Bonds’ weight went from about one-hundred and ninety pounds to about two-hundred and thirty. At the same time, his home run production went from an average of thirty-four per year over his first twelve big league seasons to an average of forty-six per season.
In 2003, federal investigators began investigating Balco Laboratory in Burlingame, California. The names of thirty big league players who had received treatment through the lab’s products, including Barry Lamar Bonds, was uncovered. A grand jury investigation and Bonds testimony followed. Bonds’ boyhood friend, Greg Anderson, a trainer at Balco Lab was arrested for refusing to testify about his recent relationship with Barry Bonds as a lab employee.
Through all of this, we learned from the testimony of Barry Bonds’ former girlfriend Kimberly Bell that Bonds was jealous of Mark McGwire and that he was determined to compete with McGwire’s reputation.
FAME OR INFAMY. Meanwhile, Barry Bonds denies and fans take sides. In San Francisco, many fans don’t want to believe. Still other fans believe but excuse. “How perfect was Ty Cobb or Babe Ruth?” they ask, pointing to Ruth’s drinking and womanizing along with Ty Cobb’s mean and nearly demonic behavior. Some even concede that Bonds may have taken steroids, but they defend it by wondering outloud how many pitchers were probably taking steroids at the same time, thereby equalizing or even countering the power of a batter such as Mark McGwire, Sammy Sosa or Barry Bonds.
Home run hitting requires more than strength. It also requires judgment and timing—which is why I began my description of Bonds’ record breaking home run as I did. Past baseball rosters are loaded with the names of brutally strong men who couldn’t and therefore didn’t hit home runs.
Outside of the Bay Area, fans are far less understanding. Commissioner Bud Selig has obviously hedged his bets by offering Barry Bonds offhanded and almost noncommittal congratulations.
What the future holds for Barry bonds, no one can say. The statute of limitations on his possible perjury before the grand jury runs out in 2008, so Barry may well avoid punishment for perjury. However, the weight of public opinion on Barry Bonds’ reputation may matter when the time comes to vote him into the baseball Hall of Fame.
Barry Bonds is talented beyond all question when it comes to production on the baseball diamond. For that reason, he deserves to be famous. However, if the sum total of Barry’s past and present adds up to infamy as much or more than it totals fame, then he may join Benedict Arnold, Aaron Burr, Spiro Agnew and others in the American public’s Historic Hall of Shame.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
EDWIN COONEY
Sunday, August 12, 2007
Sunday, August 5, 2007
CLINTON VS OBAMA — DEBATE OR SHOW?
By Edwin Cooney
Dated Friday, August 3rd, 2007
It had to happen, you know. It was just a matter of time. Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama were bound to have a difference the media would find compelling and on which you and I could take sides.
The question is whether there is really an issue of experience vs. naïveté here or whether this is a contrived quarrel
It all began during a CNN/YouTube Democratic debate on the night of Monday, July 23rd. Senator Barack Obama responded affirmatively to a question as to whether or not he would agree to meet with rogue leaders of such countries as Syria, North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela during the first year of his administration. Senator Clinton wasted little time suggesting that Senator Obama’s response was reckless and naïve and indicative of his lack of experience so essential to any successful presidency. A few days later on the campaign trail, Senator Obama upped the intensity of the “debate” by asserting that what America doesn‘t need is “Bush Lite” in the White House.
From what I’ve gathered, the consensus is that Senator Clinton has come out ahead on this “issue” because everyone knows that any substantive bilateral meeting or “summit” necessarily requires careful preparation. Pre-summit preparedness was one of the rare issues on which John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon concurred during their second debate in 1960.
“Ah, but that’s politics,” you say — but that’s just the point. JFK and RMN had little to gain by disagreeing on the need for pre-summit preparation, but Barack and Hillary both have something to gain by debating this issue.
Senator C. wants to demonstrate that Senator O.’s inexperience is shown by his willingness to consider summitry with “rogue” leaders during the first year of a possible Obama presidency. She wants you to think that she’s experienced and he’s merely naive.
Senator O. wants to demonstrate that Senator C. is simply taking the path of least resistance or “the establishment position” just as she did when she voted to authorize President Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq — which he, with all of his inexperience, opposed. He wants you to see him as bold and creative and to view her as dangerously narrow and cautious.
What neither Senator Clinton nor Senator Obama is expounding much on is what it takes to conduct a successful summit. Neither are they speculating much about the significance of past summit meetings. So, perhaps a quick look at some questionable summit meetings might be helpful.
Since May 8th, 1945, which we celebrated as VE Day, there have been 18 meetings between American presidents and Soviet leaders. The first one, held at Potsdam just outside of Berlin, Germany, has been considered a failure by many historians and commentators because it solidified and officially sanctified the Soviet Union’s tyranny over Eastern Europe. No one, in-so-far as I’m aware, chalks that failure up to President Truman’s mere three months of presidential experience—and they shouldn’t. After all, post-war spheres of influence by the great powers were regarded as inevitable throughout the war. As for preparedness being a factor at Potsdam, it could hardly have been a factor especially since the British government changed hands in the middle of the conference. Winston Churchill came to the Potsdam conference as Prime Minister and was replaced on July 23rd by Clement Atlee… so much for summit predictability or continuity.
The second post-war meeting between the two “Super Powers” didn’t occur for ten years after World War II. American-Soviet meetings were “conferences” during the war. However, now that the war was over, we and the Soviets were adversaries rather than allies, thus our meetings became “summits” rather than conferences.
By July 1955, President Eisenhower felt that the Soviet Union might well be ready for the easement of international tensions. The Soviets, after all, had agreed to the independence of Austria the previous May (thereby allowing for the restoration of Austria’s constitutional monarchy) and had expressed a willingness to discuss the limitation of nuclear stockpiles.
The American people weren’t so sure of the wisdom of an American - Soviet meeting at “the summit.” Many believed (I think incorrectly) that FDR was either bullied by Stalin or bamboozled due to naiveté and illness into “giving away” Eastern Europe to the Russians during the Yalta conference of February 1945. They thought that this allowed for the drawing down of the “Iron Curtain” and they didn’t want to see any more presidential “surrendering” to the Soviets.
According to Cary Reich, one of Nelson A. Rockefeller’s biographers, Secretary of State Dulles tried to talk Ike out of the conference going so far as to insist that Geneva, Switzerland, where the summit was to be held, would be too packed with summer tourists. Ike wasn’t buying it, however.
It wasn’t until President Eisenhower made his dramatic “Open Skies” inspection proposal that either the President or the Secretary of State was sure who was making the decisions on the Soviet side. Winston Churchill had been calling for a “Big Four” summit for two years. The Soviet government was still in transition following the death of Josef Stalin. No one knew for sure whether the goateed Premier Nikolai Bulganin or the bald and beefy First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev was in charge. As a result, President Eisenhower, Churchill’s successor Prime Minister Anthony Eden of Great Britain, Prime Minister Edgar Faure of France, and the Soviet leadership met at the Palace of Nations, the old League of Nations headquarters, on Monday, July 18th, 1955.
On the afternoon of the fourth day, President Eisenhower -- without consulting either the British or the French -- announced that the United States would be willing to allow Soviet aerial inspection of its military installations for purposes of verification if the Soviets would do the same. Amidst everyone’s astonishment at the President’s proposal, a sudden loud thunderclap caused the lights to go out — as if nature itself were applauding Ike. Soviet Premier Bulganin’s comments followed Mr. Eden and Mr. Faure’s favorable responses. The Premier said that the President was obviously sincere and that the Soviet Union would give the proposal serious consideration.
Once the meeting broke up, Nikita Khrushchev cornered Eisenhower and made it plain that, as far as he was concerned, such inspection was a bald espionage ploy. Secretary Khrushchev went on to question why, if the United States was so peace-loving, it didn’t get down to business with the recent Soviet proposal for disarmament talks. Ike responded that he’d be happy to do that if the Russians would accept his proposal. Khrushchev turned and walked away.
The summit was ultimately considered a success because of the propaganda and psychological advantage the United States had gained in the eyes of the world by offering to expose its military to inspection if the Russians would do the same. In addition, our government came out of the summit with a better understanding of who was making the decisions in the Soviet government.
The first American - Soviet summit became known to the world as “The Open Skies Summit”. While “the Spirit of Geneva” wasn’t any more long-lasting than “the Spirit of Camp David” four years later in 1959, I think it’s reasonable to say that summitry was useful because the easing of tensions encouraged the leadership on both sides of the “Iron Curtain” to seek out face-saving methods of survival in the event of potentially lethal crises.
The Camp David summit occurred at the close of Nikita Khrushchev’s September 1959 visit to the United States. It set up the “Big Five” summit scheduled for Paris in May of 1960. That summit was scuttled by Khrushchev after the Russians shot down our U-2 flight and captured both the pilot and the spy plane. That failure was a failure of calculation rather than preparation.
When JFK met Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, the President was under two disadvantages. The first was as the result of our participation in the recent disaster at the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The second disadvantage was the occurrence of the “Freedom Riders” antidiscrimination campaign back home which exposed to the world the citizen inequalities existing in the United States. The ’61 summit would be followed by the Berlin crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Luckily, JFK’s knowledge of Khrushchev and Khrushchev’s knowledge of JFK enabled both leaders to find face-saving ways to avoid a disastrous confrontation. It might even be argued that the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was one of the results of the 1961 Kennedy/Khrushchev summit meeting. (However, the immediate aftermath of the 1961 Kennedy Khrushchev summit meeting was the construction of the Berlin wall along with tanks muzzle to muzzle in the streets of Berlin, bomb shelter construction here at home, and missiles and quarantine in the Gulf of Mexico in October of 1962.)
President Nixon and Soviet President Brezhnev were both well prepared for the 1972 Salt I Treaty summit meeting in Moscow and there was much ceremony and even hope, despite the yet unresolved Vietnam War. However, when they were together at Nixon’s home in San Clemente in 1973, there occurred a spontaneous disagreement over the Middle East in the middle of the night. Brezhnev had gone to bed in Tricia Nixon Cox’s room and suddenly, without warning, he called for a late night meeting with the President. The discussion, as reported by President Nixon in his memoirs, was both spontaneous and even “brutal”, but Mr. Nixon said, it paid dividends during the Yom Kippur War the following October.
In summation then, summitry can be a treacherous emotional minefield regardless of the degree of “spadework” or preparation. Neither Obama’s creativity nor Clinton’s calculated caution adequately addresses the subject of summitry for the edification of the American people. Now that Senator Obama has been creative and Senator Clinton has been defensively cautious, it should be noted that neither one of them has been through a summit meeting. Thus, it’s clear to this observer that this “debate” is much less about issues than it is about political positioning and theater.
As I said at the outset, the debate may be both entertaining and even instructive as to the judgment, creativity, and temperament of both candidates. It may even be necessary.
But even though it’s a hell-of-a-good-show, I believe those smirking people out there buying popcorn are Republicans.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
EDWIN COONEY
Dated Friday, August 3rd, 2007
It had to happen, you know. It was just a matter of time. Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama were bound to have a difference the media would find compelling and on which you and I could take sides.
The question is whether there is really an issue of experience vs. naïveté here or whether this is a contrived quarrel
It all began during a CNN/YouTube Democratic debate on the night of Monday, July 23rd. Senator Barack Obama responded affirmatively to a question as to whether or not he would agree to meet with rogue leaders of such countries as Syria, North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela during the first year of his administration. Senator Clinton wasted little time suggesting that Senator Obama’s response was reckless and naïve and indicative of his lack of experience so essential to any successful presidency. A few days later on the campaign trail, Senator Obama upped the intensity of the “debate” by asserting that what America doesn‘t need is “Bush Lite” in the White House.
From what I’ve gathered, the consensus is that Senator Clinton has come out ahead on this “issue” because everyone knows that any substantive bilateral meeting or “summit” necessarily requires careful preparation. Pre-summit preparedness was one of the rare issues on which John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon concurred during their second debate in 1960.
“Ah, but that’s politics,” you say — but that’s just the point. JFK and RMN had little to gain by disagreeing on the need for pre-summit preparation, but Barack and Hillary both have something to gain by debating this issue.
Senator C. wants to demonstrate that Senator O.’s inexperience is shown by his willingness to consider summitry with “rogue” leaders during the first year of a possible Obama presidency. She wants you to think that she’s experienced and he’s merely naive.
Senator O. wants to demonstrate that Senator C. is simply taking the path of least resistance or “the establishment position” just as she did when she voted to authorize President Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq — which he, with all of his inexperience, opposed. He wants you to see him as bold and creative and to view her as dangerously narrow and cautious.
What neither Senator Clinton nor Senator Obama is expounding much on is what it takes to conduct a successful summit. Neither are they speculating much about the significance of past summit meetings. So, perhaps a quick look at some questionable summit meetings might be helpful.
Since May 8th, 1945, which we celebrated as VE Day, there have been 18 meetings between American presidents and Soviet leaders. The first one, held at Potsdam just outside of Berlin, Germany, has been considered a failure by many historians and commentators because it solidified and officially sanctified the Soviet Union’s tyranny over Eastern Europe. No one, in-so-far as I’m aware, chalks that failure up to President Truman’s mere three months of presidential experience—and they shouldn’t. After all, post-war spheres of influence by the great powers were regarded as inevitable throughout the war. As for preparedness being a factor at Potsdam, it could hardly have been a factor especially since the British government changed hands in the middle of the conference. Winston Churchill came to the Potsdam conference as Prime Minister and was replaced on July 23rd by Clement Atlee… so much for summit predictability or continuity.
The second post-war meeting between the two “Super Powers” didn’t occur for ten years after World War II. American-Soviet meetings were “conferences” during the war. However, now that the war was over, we and the Soviets were adversaries rather than allies, thus our meetings became “summits” rather than conferences.
By July 1955, President Eisenhower felt that the Soviet Union might well be ready for the easement of international tensions. The Soviets, after all, had agreed to the independence of Austria the previous May (thereby allowing for the restoration of Austria’s constitutional monarchy) and had expressed a willingness to discuss the limitation of nuclear stockpiles.
The American people weren’t so sure of the wisdom of an American - Soviet meeting at “the summit.” Many believed (I think incorrectly) that FDR was either bullied by Stalin or bamboozled due to naiveté and illness into “giving away” Eastern Europe to the Russians during the Yalta conference of February 1945. They thought that this allowed for the drawing down of the “Iron Curtain” and they didn’t want to see any more presidential “surrendering” to the Soviets.
According to Cary Reich, one of Nelson A. Rockefeller’s biographers, Secretary of State Dulles tried to talk Ike out of the conference going so far as to insist that Geneva, Switzerland, where the summit was to be held, would be too packed with summer tourists. Ike wasn’t buying it, however.
It wasn’t until President Eisenhower made his dramatic “Open Skies” inspection proposal that either the President or the Secretary of State was sure who was making the decisions on the Soviet side. Winston Churchill had been calling for a “Big Four” summit for two years. The Soviet government was still in transition following the death of Josef Stalin. No one knew for sure whether the goateed Premier Nikolai Bulganin or the bald and beefy First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev was in charge. As a result, President Eisenhower, Churchill’s successor Prime Minister Anthony Eden of Great Britain, Prime Minister Edgar Faure of France, and the Soviet leadership met at the Palace of Nations, the old League of Nations headquarters, on Monday, July 18th, 1955.
On the afternoon of the fourth day, President Eisenhower -- without consulting either the British or the French -- announced that the United States would be willing to allow Soviet aerial inspection of its military installations for purposes of verification if the Soviets would do the same. Amidst everyone’s astonishment at the President’s proposal, a sudden loud thunderclap caused the lights to go out — as if nature itself were applauding Ike. Soviet Premier Bulganin’s comments followed Mr. Eden and Mr. Faure’s favorable responses. The Premier said that the President was obviously sincere and that the Soviet Union would give the proposal serious consideration.
Once the meeting broke up, Nikita Khrushchev cornered Eisenhower and made it plain that, as far as he was concerned, such inspection was a bald espionage ploy. Secretary Khrushchev went on to question why, if the United States was so peace-loving, it didn’t get down to business with the recent Soviet proposal for disarmament talks. Ike responded that he’d be happy to do that if the Russians would accept his proposal. Khrushchev turned and walked away.
The summit was ultimately considered a success because of the propaganda and psychological advantage the United States had gained in the eyes of the world by offering to expose its military to inspection if the Russians would do the same. In addition, our government came out of the summit with a better understanding of who was making the decisions in the Soviet government.
The first American - Soviet summit became known to the world as “The Open Skies Summit”. While “the Spirit of Geneva” wasn’t any more long-lasting than “the Spirit of Camp David” four years later in 1959, I think it’s reasonable to say that summitry was useful because the easing of tensions encouraged the leadership on both sides of the “Iron Curtain” to seek out face-saving methods of survival in the event of potentially lethal crises.
The Camp David summit occurred at the close of Nikita Khrushchev’s September 1959 visit to the United States. It set up the “Big Five” summit scheduled for Paris in May of 1960. That summit was scuttled by Khrushchev after the Russians shot down our U-2 flight and captured both the pilot and the spy plane. That failure was a failure of calculation rather than preparation.
When JFK met Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, the President was under two disadvantages. The first was as the result of our participation in the recent disaster at the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The second disadvantage was the occurrence of the “Freedom Riders” antidiscrimination campaign back home which exposed to the world the citizen inequalities existing in the United States. The ’61 summit would be followed by the Berlin crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Luckily, JFK’s knowledge of Khrushchev and Khrushchev’s knowledge of JFK enabled both leaders to find face-saving ways to avoid a disastrous confrontation. It might even be argued that the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was one of the results of the 1961 Kennedy/Khrushchev summit meeting. (However, the immediate aftermath of the 1961 Kennedy Khrushchev summit meeting was the construction of the Berlin wall along with tanks muzzle to muzzle in the streets of Berlin, bomb shelter construction here at home, and missiles and quarantine in the Gulf of Mexico in October of 1962.)
President Nixon and Soviet President Brezhnev were both well prepared for the 1972 Salt I Treaty summit meeting in Moscow and there was much ceremony and even hope, despite the yet unresolved Vietnam War. However, when they were together at Nixon’s home in San Clemente in 1973, there occurred a spontaneous disagreement over the Middle East in the middle of the night. Brezhnev had gone to bed in Tricia Nixon Cox’s room and suddenly, without warning, he called for a late night meeting with the President. The discussion, as reported by President Nixon in his memoirs, was both spontaneous and even “brutal”, but Mr. Nixon said, it paid dividends during the Yom Kippur War the following October.
In summation then, summitry can be a treacherous emotional minefield regardless of the degree of “spadework” or preparation. Neither Obama’s creativity nor Clinton’s calculated caution adequately addresses the subject of summitry for the edification of the American people. Now that Senator Obama has been creative and Senator Clinton has been defensively cautious, it should be noted that neither one of them has been through a summit meeting. Thus, it’s clear to this observer that this “debate” is much less about issues than it is about political positioning and theater.
As I said at the outset, the debate may be both entertaining and even instructive as to the judgment, creativity, and temperament of both candidates. It may even be necessary.
But even though it’s a hell-of-a-good-show, I believe those smirking people out there buying popcorn are Republicans.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
EDWIN COONEY
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)