WHO OUGHT WE TO BE IN OUR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS?

By Edwin Cooney

In his September 19th, 1796 farewell message to young America, President Washington wrote that we ought to be friendly to all nations and ally ourselves with none. Twenty-seven years and three months later during his annual State of the Union message, President Monroe, a fellow Virginian, less than a friend of President Washington due to the former president's signing of the Jay Treaty and his coolness toward France, issued his famous Monroe Doctrine. That newly-proposed doctrine guaranteed the sovereignty of all the Americas from the power and influence of European nations. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, who had been in the diplomatic corps since the Washington administration, was the author of the Monroe Doctrine. He proposed that doctrine to President Monroe following twenty-five years of experience dealing with Britain, France, Russia, and remaining European powers when it came to matters of peace and war. It's not likely that George Washington would have approved the Monroe Doctrine, not only due to his less-than-flattering view of the dimpled-chin and good-tempered Monroe, but because the world had changed significantly since Saturday, March 4th, 1797, the day Washington laid down his presidential duties.

Not until 1917 did a president ever suggest that foreign affairs could be a threat to American democracy. So ingrained was our determination that America ought to avoid foreign "entanglements" that isolationism strongly prevailed, even in California the night before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Even then, many isolationists preferred to believe that Pearl Harbor occurred due to the deviltry of Franklin Roosevelt rather than to aggressive intentions of Germany, Italy and Japan.

Even during President Washington's era (three years following his death), President Jefferson took advantage of Napoleon's desire to conquer Europe by purchasing Louisiana from the French to fund France's war, which fitted in nicely with President Jefferson's desire to occupy as much of the North American continent as possible. What made President Jefferson's forward-looking proposal so surprising was the fact that the president's proposal to purchase territory could be found nowhere in the Constitution to which TJ was publicly so dedicated to follow. Jefferson's venture established early the reality that practicality not principle was clearly our "lodestar" when it came to foreign affairs.

We were able to win both the war and the peace with Japan, Italy and Germany after WWII because culturally we were similar to the cultures of Italy and Germany, and even Japan possessed a significantly strong historical tie to military leadership to enable them to respond positively to a new constitution dictated to them by General Douglas MacArthur.

Two other concepts too often get in our way of our ability to affect a successful foreign policy. The great lesson our presidents since WWII have drummed into us is the idea that we must act to avoid appeasement to those whose governments differ from our ideas and mores. Appeasement of Adolf Hitler was a factor in our lack of readiness to clash with Germany, but appeasement wasn't the cause of WWII. The cause of the Second World War was the Versailles peace treaty with its unjust and unforeseen conditions and circumstances. Yet, it was our determination that appeasement be avoided in our response to the threat of advancing Communism that blinded us to the fact that North Vietnam fought not so much for the advancement of Communism as for the end of foreign domination of its own culture and land. One would be hard-pressed to demonstrate how a united Vietnam has advanced Communism — especially by those who claim we won the "cold war" against Communism!

The second concept is that we have peace in areas of the world because we've established bases in areas such as South Korea, and could have peace in Afghanistan, if we would establish military bases such as those we've established in some of the former countries that once were part of the "Warsaw Pact" between Eastern Europe and Moscow. There is no "peace" in Korea, only a truce signed Monday, July 27th, 1953. Nor was their "peace" between us and North Vietnam, signed in Paris, France by Secretary of State William P. Rogers Saturday, January 27th, 1973. That "truce" fell apart in April of 1975 under President Gerald R. Ford. Peace is not the mere absence of war, peace is a state of mind — someone certainly smarter than this observer once said!

I propose the adoption of the following principles that could avoid the current "crisis" in Afghanistan.

First: we must establish military agreements only with nations with whom we have similar cultural, legal and religious traditions and understandings.

Second: once we join in a military conflict our goal should be absolute military victory with the understanding that we have a strong voice in the formation of the post-conflict government.

Third: Conflict Resolutions: we should form a conflict resolutions process made up of nations with sufficient resources to limit supplies that might be available to nations with a habit of supplying the materials to create revolutions against small governments with insufficient militaries.

Fourth: nation-building or nation-smashing should be illegal and punishable by international sanctions or collective trade boycotting. (Certainly Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon would have been nervous about international boycotting sanctions during the Vietnam era.)

Fifth: every nation's sovereignty should be protected from outside military attack, but subjected to trade and other economic sanction activity for violation of human rights expectations.

Sixth: every nation from within the body of the United Nations should be obligated to ban practices that endanger the world's environment.

Seventh: every nation limiting or banning immigration must demonstrate that its sanction against immigrants is not based on racial or religious prejudices but rather on potential economic or environmental factors.

Eighth: military alliances and balances of power, including NATO, SETO, and the Arab League should be abandoned as simply warlike in their purposes.

Ninth: organizations such as the Peace Corps, the International Red Cross, even religious charities must be encouraged so long as they aren't tied to political or military goals and services.

Tenth: everyone should keep in mind that peace is not merely an absence of war, but a state of mind!

As for the above proposals, they merely reflect the world as I see it. The only purpose of the above is to stimulate thought and even debate. As I see things, the most vital and encouraging factor is that most of us seem to be aware that the way things are working at present are far from satisfactory. I certainly realize that that's a rather weak start, but it's equally true (as the Chinese once said) that "a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step!”

As tired and even bored as we all may be with clichés, keep in mind that there may be enough truth in all of them to push us to the starting line of a better future.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

EDWIN COONEY